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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Constitutional Law-District of Columbia Circuit Holds Fourth
Amendment Protections Apply to International Letter Mail.-Charles
W. Ramsey was convicted in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia on, inter alia, one count of unlawful importation of heroin' and
three counts of unlawful use of a communication facility. 2 Similarly, codefendant, James W. Kelly, was convicted on one count of unlawful importation and one count of unlawful use of a communication facility.
In November of 1973, Sylvia Bailey and William Ward were engaged in
international drug trade while residing in West Germany. West German
officials, however, pursuant to a court order, had placed Bailey and Ward
under electronic surveillance. This resulted in the officials' interception of
several incriminating trans-Atlantic conversations between Bailey and defendant Ramsey concerning narcotics. When Ward and Bailey subsequently
traveled to Thailand in January of 1974, the Thai officials were warned of
their presence by West German agents. Accordingly, the Thai officials kept
Ward and Bailey under surveillance and, as a result, observed Ward mailing
letter-sized envelopes in six different mail boxes. On February 2, 1974, Bailey
and Ward were arrested in their hotel room by Thai officials who seized
numerous heroin-filled envelopes. These included envelopes addressed to mail
drops in Washington, D.C. with which defendants Ramsey and Kelly were
later found to be connected.
In New York on February 4, 1974, without any knowledge of the foregoing, probable cause or a search warrant, a customs inspector seized, opened
and searched eight sealed envelopes because they had been mailed from
Thailand, which is a known source of heroin, and were addressed to four
different places in the Washington area. In the course of the search, the
3
inspector discovered that the envelopes did indeed contain heroin. Six of
them were then resealed, forwarded and delivered to three of the Washington
addresses, where federal agents witnessed defendant Kelly claim the envelopes and rendezvous with co-defendant Ramsey. The agents then arrested
both men and the convitions in the district court followed.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that such a warrantless search was in violation of the fourth amendment4

1. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1970).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1970).
3. The customs inspector testified at the trial that foreign airmail coming into the country vas
"placed on a conveyor belt for sorting, and during that process he would remove any items that
looked 'suspicious.' " United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted,
45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976) (No. 76-167). The Bureau of National Affairs has
misprinted the Supreme Court docket number in the Ramsey case as 75-167.
4. The fourth amendment guarantees that "[tlhe right of the people to be secure in their
person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
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and accordingly reversed the convictions. United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d
415 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976)
(No. 76-167).
The question whether a United States Customs Agent may constitutionally
open international mail without either a search warrant or probable cause is
one which has received varying treatment in the several circuits but surprisingly enough has never been ruled on by the Supreme Court.
Although domestic first class mail has long been protected against warrantless searches or seizures 6 and the use of the mails has been declared to be
"as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues," 7 international
mail has never, until Ramsey, been squarely accorded the full protection of
the fourth amendment. 8
The free speech aspect of the use of the mails was a primary consideration
for the Ramsey court, which was concerned that warrantless searches of letter
mail would have a chilling or inhibiting effect on individuals' exercise of their
freedom of speech. 9 However, in a majority of the cases dealing with the
subject, the courts have failed to recognize the first amendment' 0 implications
and have reached their decisions solely on the basis that international mail,
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Barclift, 514 F.2d 1073, 1074-75 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975) (the court held that international letter mail falls within the border
search exception); United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1975) (same); United States
v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148, 150-51 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088 (1974) (same); United
States v. Doe, 472 F.2d 982, 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969 (1973) (the court held that
international package mail falls within the border search exception); United States v. Galvez, 465
F.2d 681, 687 (10th Cir. 1972) (same). But cf. United States v. Swede, 326 F. Supp. 533, 535-36
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (the court stated that its determination of whether an envelope entering the
country in the mail could be lawfully searched without a search warrant depended on whether the
envelope be deemed a package or a letter); United States v. Sohnen, 298 F. Supp. 51, 55
(E.D.N.Y. 1969) (the court held that international package mail falls within the border search
exception but stated that the fourth amendment may well prevent the opening of letters as
opposed to packages without a search warrant). But see United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415,
421 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976) (No. 76-167) (the court
held that the fourth amendment prevented customs officials from opening international letter mall
without a search warrant).
6. E.g., United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251 (1970); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S.
727 (1878). "The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers
against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed [sealed] against
inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined
under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to
be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household." Id. at 733.
7. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
8. 538 F.2d at 421.
9. Id.at 420.
10. The first amendment guarantees in pertinent part that Congress shall make no law
"abridging the freedom of speech .... ." U.S. Const. amend. I.
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when crossing the border into the United States, falls within the border search
exception to the protections against search and seizure ordinarily provided by
the fourth amendment.II Characteristically, in United States v. Barclift, 12 the
court stated simply that "[n]o meaningful distinction .

.

. can be drawn

between the entry
of mail into the United States and the entry of automobiles
13
or baggage.'
Traditionally, restrictions on imports and searches of persons and packages
at the national borders have rested on rules which differ from the domestically
required constitutional limits.' 4 As a result, it is generally held that, although
the border search is also subject to the general test of reasonableness, such a
search may be made with or without probable cause or on mere suspicion
alone. s In fact, entry into the United States from a foreign country by itself
has been held to be sufficient reason to conduct a border search.' 6 Ultimately,
therefore, the only judicial review available in customs search cases involves a
consideration of whether the search complained
of was actually a border
7
search, and whether it was "reasonable."'
Thus, customs agents have been given broad powers to conduct border
searches at their own discretion. They have not been required to conform to
any specific standards' 8 other than that their actions meet the elusive criteria
11. E.g., United States v. Barclift, 514 F.2d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 842 (1975) (held that search of letter mail could not be distinguished from search of
baggage); United States v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148, 150-51 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088
(1974) (customs inspectors held free to inspect any mail which attracts their attention); United
States v. Beckley, 335 F.2d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 922 (1965) (court
determined there was no reason why the border search exception should not apply to mail coming
into the country). But see United States v. Sohnen, 298 F. Supp. 51. 55 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (fourth
amendment protection is limited by government's customs power and the absence of any first
amendment interest).
12. 514 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975).
13. Id. at 1074.
14. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973); United States v.
Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376-77 (1971); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
154 (1925); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1886).
15. E.g., United States v. Lincoln, 494 F.2d 833, 837 (9th Cir. 1974) (customs agents need
not have probable cause to conduct a border search); United States v. Henriquez, 483 F.2d 65
(5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1095 (1973) (border searches may be made on the
basis of mere suspicion alone).
16. E.g., United States v. Kessler, 497 F.2d 277, 279 (9th Cir. 1974) (customs agents may
search goods or persons on grounds that they have just entered the country); Klein v. United
States, 472 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1973) ("border search ... may be made with or without cause
or on 'unsupported' or 'mere' suspicion alone.").
17. See Morales v. United States, 378 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1967). Whether the search was
reasonable will depend upon an examination of the facts. Id. at 189. In United States v. Sohnen,
298 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), the court stated that a "determination of whether an
administrative search is 'reasonable' . . . involves the striking of a balance between the
government's need to know and to inspect in our complex, highly regulated society and the
individual's right to the privacy of his person, thoughts and possessions." Id. at 54.
18. However, in order to conduct a strip search of a person there must be "real suspidon."
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discernible from the word "reasonable." In light of this power, those courts
which have held that international mail falls within the border search
exception to the fourth amendment necessarily have rendered international
mail subject to search at the discretion of the customs agents.
The rationale for the border search exception generally has been based on
the persuasive and widely accepted proposition that the national government
has a long standing historical right and an equally valid security interest to
protect its borders against smuggling of contraband and items subject to
customs duties. 19 Cases questioning the warrantless search of international
mail, however, have only recently been presented to the courts, largely as a
result of the recent increase in illegally imported narcotics. Many courts which
have been presented with the issue 20 have relied upon Carroll v. United
States, 21 a case which arose during the prohibition era, for the proposition
that "[t]ravellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary
because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the
country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects
which may be lawfully brought in." '22 Finding little difference between goods,
bags and packages entering the country with a traveler and those entering
through the mails, the courts have uniformly applied the national selfprotection reasoning to hold that international package mail falls within the
23
border search exception to the fourth amendment.
24
Thus in United States v. Swede, the court reasoned that "[i]f a customs
officer may stop a person at an international border and conduct a 'border
search' without having first procured a search warrant, or having probable
cause to believe that the person searched has committed a crime, it must
follow that a package making a similar crossing is subject to at least the same
inconvenience. '2- This view was buttressed in United States v. Sohnen,26
United States v. Chase, 503 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948 (1975);
United States v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89, 94 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Sosa, 469 F.2d 271, 272
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973). And in order to conduct a body cavity search
there must be a "clear indication." United States v. Holtz, supra at 92; United States v. Sosa,
supra at 272.
19. See United States v. Sohnen, 298 F. Supp. 51, 54-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
20. E.g., United States v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088
(1974); United States v. Doe, 472 F.2d 982, 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969 (1973);
United States v. Beckley, 335 F.2d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 922 (1965);
United States v. Sohnen, 298 F. Supp. 51, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
21. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
22. Id.at 154.
23. E.g., United States v. Doe, 472 F.2d 982, 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969 (1973);
United States v. Galvez, 465 F.2d 681, 687 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Swede, 326 F.
Supp. 533, 535-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. Sohnen, 298 F. Supp. 51, 54-55 (E.D.N.Y.
1969); see United States v. Beckley, 335 F.2d 86, 88-89 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 922
(1965).
24. 326 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
25. Id. at 536 (citation omitted).
26. 298 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
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where the court argued that national security interest, together with the need
for efficiency created by the great bulk of items crossing the border into the
country, required an international package mail exception to the fourth
amendment. 27 The court stated that "[a] quick and expeditious method of
examining people and goods entering the country is essential if customs
regulations and laws against smuggling are to be enforced without undue
embarrassment and delay to travelers
and without clogging mails and other
'28
conduits of goods from abroad.
Similarly, the court in United States v. Beckley 29 upheld the warrantless
intrusion by a customs inspector into a sealed package which had been
deposited in the United States mail in the Canal Zone and addressed to the
defendant in Detroit. The requisite customs declaration had been attached to
the package30 by the addressor indicating that it contained only inconsequential materials. 3' Subsequently, when this seemingly innocuous package arrived
at a post office in Miami, a customs entry clerk, who had no basis to suspect
that it did not contain the items listed on the customs declaration, summarily
proceeded to open and inspect the package. 32 The Sixth Circuit determined
that there was no reason why the historical border search exception to the
fourth amendment should not be applied to a package entering the country by
mail33 and stated that the "Fourth Amendment standards applicable to mail
matter moving entirely within the country are not applicable to mail matter
coming in from outside the country
at least where it appears that a customs
34
determination must be made.1
Furthermore, where border searches lead to the discovery of contraband or
illegally imported materials, the courts uniformly have upheld subsequent
controlled or monitored deliveries of the packages containing such materials
in order to effectuate an arrest of the addressee.3 S Moreover, in Beckley, a
narcotics importation case where such a controlled delivery was made, the
court stated that "[e]ven if there were violations of federal statutes both in
delaying the package and in failing to confiscate [the contraband], these
violations would not be a basis for suppressing evidence.1 36 Decisions which
27. Id. at 54-55.
28. Id. at 54.
29. 335 F.2d 86, 88-89 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 922 (1965).
30. 39 C.F.R. § 21.4 (1975).
31. The package purportedly contained "two wall mats, four pillow cases and two dress robes
of a total value of $23.00." 335 F.2d at 87.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 89.
34. Id. at 88. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Galvez, 465 F.2d 681 (10th Cir.
1972) and the Second Circuit in United States v. Doe, 472 F.2d 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 969 (1973) have held that packages entering the country through international mail fall
within the border search exception to the fourth amendment.
35. E.g., United States v. Galvez, 465 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1972); Chapman v. United States,
443 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Beckley, 335 F.2d 86 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 922 (1965); United States v. Sohnen, 298 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
36. 335 F.2d at 90.
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allow customs agents to go to such lengths demonstrate the weight which the
courts have given to the national government's historical and security interest
in protecting its borders.
For the same apparent historical and security interests, the federal government, including the Postal Service and the Department of Treasury, has
chosen not to place any restrictions on the authority of customs agents beyond
what the courts have held to be the constitutional minimum. The controlling
federal statute provides that
[a]ny of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop, search,
and examine, as well without as within their respective districts, any vehicle, beast, or
person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is merchandise which is
subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the United States in any manner
contrary to law, whether by the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon such
vehicle or beast, or otherwise, and to search any trunk or envelope, wherever found,
in which he may have a reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was
imported contrary to law . . .37
Under Postal and Treasury Department Regulations, all mal 3 8 originating
outside the customs territory of the United States is subject to customs
examination. 39 In addition, pursuant to international treaty, customs inspectors at home and abroad are permitted to open international mail without
40
formality.
Nevertheless, some courts have indicated that when first amendment
aspects are implicated, as with a letter, the constitutionally permissible
authority of customs agents to intrude into personal papers may be diminished. In United States v. Swede, 4 I a customs agent without a warrant
had opened and inspected an envelope which was found to contain LSD. In
determining whether or not the envelope was lawfully searched, the court
considered it necessary to determine whether or not the envelope was actually
37. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970) (emphasis added). In United States v. Doe, 472 F.2d 982 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969 (1973), the court rejected the defendant's argument that section 482,
which required mere suspicion to search vehicles, beasts or persons but required "reasonable
cause to suspect" to search a "trunk or envelope," set a higher standard for letters and trunks
than that required by the fourth amendment. Id. at 984. The court reasoned that "[ulniess such
packages were spot-checked, the international mails would provide a broad highway for wanton
and wholesale violations of our customs laws." Id. at 985; see United States v. King, 517 F.2d
350, 352 (5th Cir. 1975).
38. With the exception of mail addressed to foreign ambassadors and ministers, certain
international organizations designated by the President or the Department of the Treasury, and
United States officials. 39 C.F.R. § 61.1 (1975); 19 C.F.R. § 145.2 (1976).
39. 39 C.F.R. § 61.1 (1975); 19 C.F.R. § 145.2 (1976). See also 19 C.F.R. § 145 (1976). It
should be noted, however, that no customs officer or employee is authorized "to read any
correspondence contained in sealed letter mail of foreign origin unless a search warrant has been
obtained in advance from an appropriate judge or U.S. magistrate which authorizes such
action." 19 C.F.R. § 145.3 (1976).
40. Universal Postal Union, July 11, 1952, [1953] 1 U.S.T. 1118, 1316, T.I.A.S. No. 2800,
169 U.N.T.S. 3, 67.
41. 326 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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a package or a letter. 42 Because there was no evidence that any letter or
written communication had ever been placed in the envelope, the court
deemed the envelope to be a package and therefore held that it had been
lawfully searched. 4 3 The court thereby avoided actually deciding whether or
not the search of international letter mail without a search warrant would
violate the fourth amendment. Similar intimations were made by the court in
United States v. Sohnen,44 where customs inspectors had made a warrantless
search of an international package which was found to contain gold coins.4 s
In determining that the search of an international package was within the
government's power to search international mail, the court added that the
government's customs power is not unlimited and that "[t]he Constitution...
may well prevent the opening of letters, as
opposed to packages containing
'46
merchandise, without a search warrant."
Two years later, however, the same court which had decided Swede
reached a decision directly on the issue and rejected the intimations of its
earlier decision. In United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 47 the court stated in its opinion "that the same showing of suspicion
based on reason necessary to justify an intrusion into a package is sufficient to
warrant intrusion into a letter. '48 The court qualified its decision, however,
by stating that a letter-sized envelope would require more than a larger-sized
envelope or package in order to raise a suspicion that it did not merely contain
a letter. 4 9 In order lawfully to search an incoming letter, then, there would
have to be some indicia, such as the customs agent's knowledge that the
addressee had received contraband material in similar envelopes, or an
unusually large number of identical envelopes, or similar evidence, which
could categorize the envelope as particularly suspicious.5 0
In comparison, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Odland,51 a case
involving the search of a letter-sized envelope, applied an extremely liberal
fourth amendment exception when it held that such an envelope "was subject
to search at the border merely because it was entering the United States from
abroad; no other fact, and no suspicion particular to this envelope, is
necessary under the regulation."- 2
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.at 535.
Id. at 536.
298 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
Id. at 53.
Id. at 55.
363 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Id.at 168.
Id.
Id.

51. 502 F.2d 148 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088 (1974).
52. Id. at 150-51. The court referred to the applicable postal regulation 39 C.F.R. § 61.1
(1975); accord, United States v. Barclift, 514 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 842 (1975). In the Ramsey case, the court rejected an argument made by the Government
that the Supreme Court has refused to limit the power to search international mail upheld in such

cases as Odland and Barclift by its denial of certiorari review. "The inference that we are
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In United States v. King,5 3 the Fifth Circuit upheld a customs agent's
warrantless intrusion into card-sized envelopes on a traditional border search
analogy and also considered the reasonable expectation of privacy standard
established in the Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States.5 4 In
Katz, the petitioner had been convicted of transmitting wagering information
by telephone in violation of federal law.5 5 The petitioner had used a public
telephone booth, to which FBI agents, acting without a warrant, had
attached electronic listening and recording devices.5 6 The resulting incriminating evidence had been introduced by the Government at trial and
admitted over petitioner's objection. In reversing and excluding the evidence
so obtained, the Supreme Court rejected the Government's argument that the
public phone booth was a public place and therefore not protected by tile
fourth amendment. The majority opined that the purpose of the fourth
amendment was to protect individual people, rather than particular places,
from unreasonable intrusions.5 7 The Court, therefore, determined that what a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home, is not
protected by the fourth amendment while "what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public" is. 58 In concurring with the
majority, Justice Harlan added that the requirements for application of fourth
amendment protections were two-fold: there must be an actual expectation of
privacy and the expectation must be one "that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable.' ",59
In applying these standards to a customs agent's warrantless intrusion into
appellants' letter mail entering the country, the court in King decided that the
appellants "could have had no reasonable expectation that their letters,
mailed from abroad, would remain uninspected. ' 60 Thus, it undeniably
appears that the weight of authority has perceived fourth amendment protections as inapplicable to international mail.
The first case to give primary consideration to the restraints which could be
placed on an individual's first amendment freedoms by unrestricted border
searches on international mail was United States v. Ramsey. 61 In Ramsey, the
unmistakably invited to draw is that the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari should be viewed as
an endorsement of the result and perhaps the reasoning of these cases. That is an invitation
which, as we ought not to have to remind the Government, conflicts with the elementary theory
of certiorari review." United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415, 418 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976) (No. 76-167).
53. 517 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1975).
54. 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harland, J., concurring). For a general discussion of the ruling
in Katz see Note, The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy-Katz v. United States, A Postscrip-

turn, 9
55.
56.
57.

Ind. L. Rev. 468 (1976).
18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1970).
389 U.S. at 348.
Id.at 351.

58. Id. at 351-52.

59. Id.at 361.
60. 517 F.2d at 354.
61. 538 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976) (No.
76-167).
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court went through a balancing process similar to that used in Sohnen which
had called for the "striking of a balance between the government's need to
know and to inspect . . . and the individual's right to the privacy of his

person, thoughts and possessions. " 62 The court
determined that the first
63
amendment considerations were paramount.
The court examined the rationale behind the traditional border search
exception to the fourth amendment. It found two basic and typical justifications. First was "the impracticability of requiring a warrant given the huge
volume of items moving across the border likely to contain contraband
....

-"64 Second was the "difficulty of obtaining a warrant when the subject of the

65
search [was] mobile, as a car or person.1
The court determined that neither justification is expressly applicable to
international letter mail. Because of the inherently limited size of a letter
envelope and consequently the limited type and volume of contraband which
could be smuggled into the country in a letter as opposed to a package, the
threat posed to national security is greatly reduced and therefore the government's need to know is similarly diminished. 66 The court further noted that
extrinsic devices could adequately detect items concealable within a letternarcotics, small pieces of jewelry, precious metals or coins-without an
67
actual, unfettered, intrusive search.
Noting simply that letter mail is not of itself mobile, as is a car or a person,
the court similarly rejected the second justification for the border search
exception. 68 Since it was early held 69 that officials may reasonably detain first
class mail for a period of up to 29 hours while they conduct investigations and
obtain a search warrant, there was no sufficient urgency to permit a warrant70
less search.

62. 298 F. Supp. at 54; see 538 F.2d at 420; note 17 supra and accompanying text.
63. It was noted that "limits on search and seizure must be especially strong where First and
Fourth Amendment values converge." 538 F.2d at 420.
64. Id. at 418. In King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926
(1965), it was stated that "[s]ound policy considerations support the special treatment accorded
border searches. Congress as well as the courts have thus recognized the peculiar and difficult law
enforcement problems that necessarily are presented by the effective policing of our extensive
national boundaries." Id. at 818.
65. 538 F.2d at 418 (citation omitted).
66. Id. at 418-20.
67. Id. at 419. To detect narcotics, trained dogs can be used, and to detect metals or jewelry,
X-ray examination or metal detectors can be used. Id. The Ramsey court suggested that "[tihese
techniques could screen out a large percentage of otherwise suspicious mail that, under current
practice, is routinely opened." Id. For a discussion of the constitutional limitation on the use of
canines see Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Use of Canines to Detect Evidence of Crime,
44 Fordham L. Rev. 973 (1976). It should be noted, however, that the Ramsey decision will make
it difficult for customs agents to intercept and confiscate obscene materials illegally entering the
country in letter-sized envelopes. Obscenity is not considered speech and is therefore not
protected by the first amendment. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957).
68. 538 F.2d at 419.
69. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
70. 538 F.2d at 419.
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Because letters "implicate both our deepest privacy and our interest in free
expression, far more than packages or suitcases or automobiles, '7 1 the Ramsey court reasoned that, even if customs agents are prohibited from reading
the mail they open, 72 and in fact do not ordinarily do so, the public
knowledge of the routine opening of letter mail would produce a chilling or
inhibiting effect on free expression. 73 The court ruled, therefore, that international letter mail cannot be opened unless on "a showing of probable
cause
'74
. . . made to and a warrant secured from a neutral magistrate.
Three additional purposes, it was noted, would be served by the warrant
requirement. First, invasions of an individual's privacy would be authorized
by "neutral magistrates rather than by officers in the heat of duty." 7 5 Second,
the warrant application would produce a record of the facts justifying its
'76
issuance and thereby minimizing "the burden of post facto judicial review."
Third, it would serve as a "bulwark against the enlistment of mail openings
not on behalf of responsible law enforcement, but rather to serve other, less
commendable purposes. '77 Emphasizing the importance of this last purpose,
the court noted the recent disclosures implicating United States intelligence
78
agencies with illegal mail searches.
The Ramsey decision, if upheld and applied in all the districts, would
obviously mandate a change in customs and postal practices respecting the
handling of international letter mail. The change, however, need not be
overly burdensome. 79 It may require that international post offices or nearby
customs offices be equipped with trained dogs and X-ray or metal detection
equipment. Yet, as the court suggested, suspicious mail, which is now
routinely opened, could be sorted, collected and run through the appropriate
tests at one time without
consuming more time than is now used to open all
"suspicious" mail.8 0 An impartial magistrate could then issue warrants to
71. Id. at 420. Thus, the argument made in United States v. King, 517 F.2d 350 (Sth Cir.
1975), that international letter mail did not meet the expectation of privacy test established In
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), was rejected. 538 F.2d at 419-20; see notes 53-60
supra and accompanying text.
72. See note 39 supra.
73. 538 F.2d at 420; see notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text.
74. 538 F.2d at 421 (footnotes omitted). A problem remaining for future courts is the
formulation of a workable definition of letter as opposed to package mail. For the purpose of the
case before it, however, the Ramsey court only found itnecessary to rule that the envelopes
involved, measuring seven by five inches and nine by four and one-half inches, were definitely
letter-sized mail. Id.at 419 n.6.
75. Id. at 421.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 420.
79. In any case, burden and inconvenience were not an overriding concern to the court, In
spite of their efforts to describe efficient methods for the implementation of the warrant
requirement. Itwas unequivocally stated that "the warrant requirement 'is not an inconvenience
to be somehow "weighed" against the claims of police efficiency ...... Id. at 422, quoting
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971).

80. 538 F.2d at 422.
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open those items for which the tests provide the necessary probable cause to
suspect that they contained contraband materials. 8' On this issue of expediency the court seemed to be influenced by the fact that after the seizure in
New York of the heroin-filled envelopes and the alerting of the Washington,
D.C. postal officials, the Washington officials sought and obtained a search
warrant before searching three similar envelopes which they had intercepted. 82 In the majority's opinion, this fact "seriously compromised" the
Government's
argument that a warrant requirement would be impractica83
ble.

It is questionable that this ruling will have as dangerously adverse an effect
on the government's power to protect its borders from smuggling as the
dissent suggests. Judge Robb argued that the same first amendment protection must be given to packages as is given to letters, because "writings of a
sensitive and personal nature, such as diaries, political tracts, and the like
84
may be transmitted in wrappings [i.e., a package] rather than envelopes.1
Therefore, the dissent implied, if the warrant requirement is applied to
letters, it must also apply to packages, and in due course to the normal and
routine customs inspection which all persons and their packages entering the
country now undergo.85 If, however, the majority's balancing process 6 is
applied in the case of packages, the scale should tip in favor of the government's need to know. This is true because packages, as opposed to letters,
more often contain dutiable or contraband materials and less often contain
writings or other personal and private materials. This conclusion is fortified
by the fact that letters are inherently communicative while packages are not.
Furthermore, federal law prohibits sending a letter in package mail unless the
letter is disclosed and the higher first class postage rates are paid, thereby
converting the package into first class mail.8 7 Also, applying the expectation
of privacy test,88 one may not expect his letters to be opened, but might well
expect that his packages will be subject to a customs examination when
crossing the border.
Of course, in cases involving the warrantless search of persons and their
packages crossing the border into the United States, the second justification
for the border search exception-the difficulty of obtaining a warrant when

81. Id.
82. Id.at 422-23.
83. Id.at 422.
84. Id. at 423 (Robb, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (Robb, J., dissenting).
86. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1723 (1970) provides in pertinent part: "Matter of the second, third, or fourth
class containing any writing or printing in addition to the original matter, other than as
authorized by law, shall not be admitted to the malls, nor delivered, except upon payment of
postage for matter of the first class, deducting therefrom any amount which may have been
prepaid by stamps affixed, unless by direction of a duly authorized officer of the Postal Service
such postage shall be remitted."
88. See note 71 supra and notes 53-60 supra and accompanying text.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

the subject is mobile 8 9-would come into play and the Ramsey decision would
be inapplicable.
The Ramsey court has attempted to guarantee private letters the reasonable
protection and respect which the public at large would expect. As such, its
decision has a certain consistency with the standards devised by the Supreme
Court in the landmark case of Katz v. United States.90 Until Ramsey, those
standards had not been applied to international letter mail.

Christopher B. Mead
89.
90.

See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
389 U.S. 347 (1967); see note 71 supra and notes 53-60 supra and accompanying text.

Torts-Premises Liability-New York Joins Minority of States Abolishing Trespasser, Licensee, Invitee Distinctions.-In what has been termed
an abrupt departure in the development of the common law, 1 the New York
Court of Appeals, in Basso v. Miller,2 has recently determined that a
landowner's 3 liability to one injured upon his land should no longer be
governed by the "antiquated distinctions between trespassers, licensees, and
invitees decisive under common law."'4 The new standard adopted by the
court is that which is applicable to negligence cases in general, i.e., the
"standard of reasonable care under the circumstances." s New York has thus
joined the growing minority of jurisdictions 6 abandoning the rigid common
1. Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 443, 354 N.E.2d 794, 799, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55,
60 (1976) (Breitel, C.J., concurring and dissenting). The decision is not as abrupt as Chief Judge
Breitel has indicated. New York had previously demonstrated its inclination toward the rule of
reasonable care for landowners. See, e.g., Martinez v. Kaufman-Kane Realty Co., 34 N.Y.2d
819, 316 N.E.2d 336, 359 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1974). Furthermore, Judge Wachtler, sitting on the same
bench as Judge Breitel, had previously called for the adoption of the rule. See his concurring
opinions in Mevorah v. Garyn, 35 N.Y.2d 934, 936-37, 324 N.E.2d 547, 365 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166
(1974), and Martinez v. Kaufman-Kane Realty Co., supra at 821-22, 316 N.E.2d at 336-37, 359
N.Y.S.2d at 51-52.
2. 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976).
3. The rules discussed herein are applicable to occupiers and possessors and are not limited to
owners. See generally 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 27.2, at 1433-34 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Harper & James]; James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed
to Trespassers, 63 Yale L.J. 144, 146-47 (1953). The term landowner is used throughout this
article merely for convenience and uniformity.
4. Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 437, 354 N.E.2d 794, 795, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55,
56 (1976).
5. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 568 (1976).
6. The leading case abolishing the common law classifications is Rowland v. Christian, 69
Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (en banc). This decision has been followed In
other jurisdictions. Smith v. Arbaugh's Rest., Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1973); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971) (en
banc); Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Mariorenzl v.
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law distinctions and has opted instead for a more flexible and realistic single
standard of care.
A landowner's liability to one injured upon his land depends upon the scope
of his duty to the injured person. 7 Traditionally, this was determined by the
entrant's status as either a trespasser, licensee or invitee. These classifications,
and the commensurate duties which they imposed, stemmed from the high
valuation which the common law placed on the possessory rights of the
landowner. 8 They were "inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the land, a
culture which traced many of its standards to a heritage of feudalism." 9 The
distinctions resulted in "a rough sliding scale, by which, as the legal status of
the visitor improves, the possessor of the land owes him more of an obligation
of protection." 10
The trespasser was at the lower end of this scale and the landowner owed
him no duty except to refrain from intentionally causing him injury." The
DiPonte, Inc., -

R.I. -, 333 A.2d 127 (1975). It was followed with respect to the distinctions

between invitees and licensees (preserving the rules as to trespassers) in three states. Mounsey v.
Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d
639 (1972); Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975).
7. The material concerning the traditional common law rules of landowner liability is
provided merely to give the reader some general insight into their background. For a more
detailed and comprehensive analysis see F. Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts (1926); Harper &
James, supra note 3, §§ 27.1-.14, at 1430-505; J. Page, The Law of Premises Liability (1976); W.
Prosser, The Law of Torts §§ 57-62, at 351-99 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Prosser];
Hughes, Duties to Trespassers: A Comparative Survey and Revaluation, 68 Yale L.J. 633 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Hughes]; James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to
Licensees and Invitees, 63 Yale L.J. 605 (1954); 25 Vand. L. Rev. 623, 623-29 (1972).
8. See Harper & James, supra note 3, § 27.1, at 1432; Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 Harv.
L. Rev. 725, 735 (1937); 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 426, 426-27 (1969).
9. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959).
10. Prosser, supra note 7, § 58, at 357.
11. Mendelowitz v. Neisner, 258 N.Y. 181, 184, 179 N.E. 378, 379 (1932); Ralff v. Long
Island R.R., 266 App. Div. 794, 41 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (1943), aff'd mem., 292 N.Y. 656, 55
N.E.2d 518 (1944). Moreover, the landowner was prohibited from maintaining some hidden
engine of destruction or what was commonly referred to as a "trap," which was considered the
equivalent of a willful or wanton act. Carradine v. City of New York, 13 N.Y.2d 291, 196
N.E.2d 259, 246 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1963) (per curiam); Mayer v. Temple Prop., Inc., 307 N.Y. 559,
563, 122 N.E.2d 909, 9-12 (1954).
The harshness of the common law rules pertaining to trespassers was considerably softened in
cases dealing with children. Such a result recognized "the special propensities of children and the
prevailing social policy of protecting them from harm ....
Barker v. Parnossa, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d
926, 929, 352 N.E.2d 880, 882, 386 N.Y.S.2d 576, 577 (1976) (Breitel, C.J., concurring). Many
jurisdictions have adopted the "attractive nuisance" doctrine as formulated by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 339 (1965). See generally Prosser, supra note 7, § 59, at 364-76 and cases cited
therein. Under the Restatement view a landowner is subject to liability if the exercise of
reasonable care could have prevented an injury caused by an artificial condition on his land
which posed an unreasonable risk to foreseeably trespassing children. New York, while not
explicitly adopting the rule, had achieved the same result by a judicial expansion of the concept of
"trap." See, e.g., Patterson v. Proctor Paint & Varnish Co., 21 N.Y.2d 447, 450-53, 235 N.E.2d
765, 767-68, 288 N.Y.S.2d 622, 625-27 (1968). The result of the special rule as to child trespassers
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landowner's duty to the licensee 2 was substantially the same, 13 though more
recently courts have extended his obligation to include the duty to warn of
known, hidden dangers unlikely to be discovered by the licensee. 14 As to the

invitee, the landowner was bound to exercise reasonable care to maintain his
premises in a reasonably safe condition.'

5

In Basso v. Miller, 16 plaintiff was injured in an accident which occurred on

property leased and operated by defendant Ice Caves Mountain, Inc. (the

Resort) as a tourist attraction during the summer months. 17 Plaintiff and the
defendant Miller rode Miller's motorcycle to the Resort upon learning that one

of its patrons had fallen into a 40-foot crevice and was being rescued.
Testimony indicated that upon reaching the entrance to the property, Miller

spoke to the attendant and told her that they wanted to help. She said that
they were not needed, and warned Miller against proceeding. Choosing to

ignore her advice, he and the plaintiff proceeded to the scene of the mishap
and participated in the rescue. Upon completion of the rescue, plaintiff and

Miller began their descent down the mountain. As the motorcycle approached a
curve it struck a series of pot holes, went out of control, and threw both riders
onto the road.18
The trial judge left the question of plaintiffs status while on the property to
has been the imposition on the possessor of "a limited obligation to the child, falling short of a
duty to prevent all forseeable harm to him, but requiring reasonable care as to those conditions
against which he may be expected to be unable to protect himself." Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 339, comment b at 198 (1965).
12. A licensee is one who is privileged to be on the land. Prosser, supra note 7, § 60, at 376.
He enters or remains upon the land with the consent, express or implied, of the landowner.
Vaughan v. Transit Dev. Co., 222 N.Y. 79, 82, 118 N.E. 219 (1917); Meyer v. Manzer, 179
Misc. 355, 356, 39 N.Y.S.2d 5, 7 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
13. Ferrari v. New York Cent. R.R., 224 App. Div. 182, 184, 230 N.Y.S. 60, 63 (4th Dep't),
aff'd, 250 N.Y. 527, 166 N.E. 311 (1928); Mendez v. Goroff, 25 Misc. 2d 1013, 1015, 203
N.Y.S.2d 568, 571 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd mem., 13 App. Div. 2d 705, 214 N.Y.S.2d 580 (2d
Dep't 1961); 33 Albany L. Rev. 230, 231 (1968).
14. Krause v. Alper, 4 N.Y.2d 518, 521, 151 N.E.2d 895, 897, 176 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351 (1958);
Bernal v. Baptist Fresh Air Home Soc'y, 275 App. Div. 88, 96, 87 N.Y.S.2d 458, 465 (Ist Dep't),
aff'd mem., 300 N.Y. 486, 88 N.E.2d 720 (1949).
Courts have avoided the harsh and unfair implications of the trespasser and licensee rules by
creating exceptions to them. See, e.g., Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 440-41, 354
N.E.2d 794, 797-98, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55, 58 (1976), which lists exceptions to the trespasser rule
previously recognized in New York. What has resulted has been referred to as a "complex
patchwork of legal classifications." 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 426, 427 (1969).
15. See Haefeli v. Woodrich Eng'r Co., 255 N.Y. 442, 448, 175 N.E. 123, 125 (1931); Melers
v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 16, 127 N.E. 491, 493 (1920). This duty required the
landowner to inspect the premises for possible defects. Haefeli v. Woodrich Eng'r Co., supra at
448, 175 N.E. at 125.
16. 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976).
17. Id. at 235, 352 N.E.2d at 869, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 564-65.
18. Id. at 236-37, 352 N.E.2d at 869, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 565. Testimony further indicated that
both Miller and plaintiff claimed to be holders of season passes to the Resort. Id.
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the jury. He charged the jury that they could properly find plaintiff either a
trespasser, licensee, or invitee, 19 and he described the duties of the Resort
commensurate with each of the classifications. 20 The jury returned a verdict
in favor of plaintiff and against both defendants. The appellate division
21
unanimously affirmed without opinion.
The court of appeals modified and ordered a new trial, 22 rejecting the
common law principles upon which the lower court had relied. The court, in
"judicially jettisoning the common law,' 23 indicated its desire to clean up the
"semantic morass" which had resulted from the classification system. 4 Specifically, the court recognized the difficulties often encountered in attempting to
fit an entrant into a specific category, 25 particularly where there is evidence
indicating a shift in plaintiff's status during the course of his stay on the
owner's premises. 2 6 Furthermore, the court noted that confusion and conflict
had resulted from the repeated judicial attempts to conform the agrarianbased common law principles to the realities of urban living through the
7
creation of numerous exceptions and subclassifications."
To clarify and simplify the law, the court adopted the "single standard of
reasonable care."128 Under this standard the landowner has a duty to " 'act as
a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition in
view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the
19. Id. at 238-39, 352 N.E.2d at 870-71, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 566. The trial court feltthat the
jury could have found plaintiff a trespasser when he entered against the wishes of the attendant,
a licensee when his presence was acquiesed in, and an invitee when he assisted in the rescue. Id.
at 239-40, 352 N.E.2d at 871, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
20. Id. at 238-39, 352 N.E.2d at 870-71, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 566. The trial judge erroneously
charged the jury as to a landowner's duty to a licensee. He stated that "they [the Resort] owed
him some duty not to let him get harmed because of a dangerous condition which existed on the
mountain . . . ." Id. at 238, 352 N.E.2d at 870, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 566. Compare text
accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
21. 47 App. Div. 2d 812, 366 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (2d Dep't 1975).
22. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976).
23. Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., RI. , , 333 A.2d 127, 131 (1975).
24. 40 N.Y.2d at 240, 352 N.E.2d at 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
25. Indeed, the court noted that much of the thousand page record in this case was devoted to
determining the plaintiff's status. Id. at 239, 352 N.E.2d at 871, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
26. Id. at 239-40, 352 N.E.2d at 871, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567. The difficulties of classification
are pointedly illustrated by the following example. "A canvasser who comes on your premises
without your consent is a trespasser. Once he has your consent, he is a licensee. Not until you do
business with him is he an invitee. . . . [I]t seems rather strange that your duty towards him
should be different when he comes up to your door from what it is when he goes away " Dunster
v. Abbott, [1953) 2 All E.R. 1572, 1574 (C.A.).
27. 40 N.Y.2d at 240, 352 N.E.2d at 871-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567 Such considerations were
raised in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1959), which
was quoted at length by the court of appeals. In Kermarec, the Supreme Court ruled that the
common law distinctions between licensees and invitees should not be applied to maritime law.
Id. at 631.
28. 40 N.Y.2d at 241, 352 N.E.2d at 872", 386 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
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seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk.' "29 The
plaintiff's status, previously determinative 30of the landowner's duty, is now
simply one factor in determining liability.
An indication of how this new standard would affect subsequent cases was
announced in the companion case of Scurti v. New York. 31 Scurti involved a
fourteen year old child who was electrocuted while playing in a railroad yard
abutting a city playground. Evidence indicated that the fence separating the
park from the railroad property was in disrepair, rendering the railroad yard
easily accessible to children using the park. It 3was
conceded that the plaintiff
2
was trespassing when the accident occurred.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff was
a trespasser. The appellate division affirmed with two judges dissenting.13
The court of appeals, based on its ruling in Basso, ordered a new trial. The
majority of the court's opinion was devoted to indicating "in general terms,
how this trial should differ from a trial held under prior law, and what factors
conclusive under prior law, may continue to have some relevance in determining the liability of a landowner for injury to one who concededly entered the
'3 4
property without permission.
The court felt that the justifications advanced to support the trespasser
rule3s and the exceptions created to avoid its harsh results3 6 would continue to
have relevance under the single standard approach. For example, it had been
argued that the landowner's relative immunity from liability to trespassers
was justified on three grounds: first, the presence of uninvited persons could
not be reasonably foreseen;37 second, a landowner should not be unreasonably
burdened in the enjoyment of his property by being required to protect
unforeseen intruders from injury; 38 and finally, a person who enters land
without permission has assumed the risk of any dangers found upon the
land. 39 The court found that the assumptions upon which each of these
justifications was based "obviously have some probative value . . . To say

29. Id., quoting Smith v. Arbaugh's Rest., Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
30. 40 N.Y.2d at 241, 352 N.E.2d at 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 568. "[Clonsiderations of who
plaintiff is and what his purpose is upon the land are factors which, if known, may be included in

arriving at what would be reasonable care under the circumstances." Id.
31.

40 N.Y.2d 433, 354 N.E.2d 794, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1976).

32.

Id. at 438, 354 N.E.2d at 795, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 56.

33.

47 App. Div. 2d 650, 364 N.Y.S.2d 23 (2d Dep't 1975).

34.
35.

40 N.Y.2d at 439, 354 N.E.2d at 796, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 57.
See note 11 supra and accompanying text.

36.

See note 14 supra.

37.

See Harper & James, supra note 3, at 1436-37; Prosser, supra note 7, at 358.

38. See Harper & James, supra note 3, at 1437-38; Prosser, supra note 7, at 359.
39. Keenan v. Lawyers Mortgage Co., 254 App. Div. 348, 351, 5 N.Y.S.2d 18, 20 (1st Dep't
1938), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 525, 19 N.E.2d 925 (1939) (per curiam); Prosser, supra note 7, at 358-59.
See also Hughes, supra note 7, at 687-88.
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[however] that the hypothetical factors are always present and thus entitled to
conclusive effect in all cases is the purest legal fiction . . .,,0
The landowner's right to enjoy his property as he desires must now be
tempered by reasonable efforts to protect those whose presence is reasonably
to be foreseen. It should be stressed that the standard by which a defendant's
actions are to be judged is that of reasonableness. As the court cautioned, any
limitation on a landowner's right to enjoy his land "should not pose an
unreasonable burden on the use of the property since all that is now required
is the exercise of reasonable care ... The defendant can always show that it
would have been unduly burdensome to have done more . ... 1 Furthermore, the unauthorized nature of the plaintiff's entry may very well
demonstrate that his presence
was unforeseeable. Obviously, however, this is
42
not always the case.
The court further indicated that many of the considerations which had
inspired courts to create exceptions to the common law rules would also be
taken into account under the single standard. 43 As an example, the court
referred to the distinction between "active" and "passive" negligence. This
exception reflected the rationale that it was "more reasonable to expect a
landowner to abate an activity than it is to correct a dangerous condition.""
Such factors will continue to be probative of the landowner's duty only to the
extent that they reflect the relative burdens imposed upon the landowner.
They will not, however, be solely determinative of that duty.
Finally, the court cautioned that the abolition of the common law distinctions "does not mean that every case involving injury on private property
raises a factual question for the jury's consideration. "' 4s In both Basso and
40.

40 N.Y.2d at 440, 354 N.E.2d at 797, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 58. For instance, the facts of a

certain case might well demonstrate that the trespassers were foreseen and that with minimal
effort the landowner could have prevented the plaintiffs injuries. Id.
41.

Id. at 442, 354 N.E.2d at 798, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 59.

42. All cases rejecting the common law rules have indicated that the nature of plaintiffs entry
will have some bearing on the foreseeability of his presence. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69
Cal. 2d 108, 117, 443 P.2d 561, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1968) (en banc); Peterson v. Balach,
294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972).

Under prior law, when a plaintiff was found to be a trespasser, his presence was in effect
deemed to be unforeseeable as a matter of law. As such considerations are no longer determinative, the foreseeability of an entrant will be decided on a case by case basis. "Thus, although the
foreseeability of harm to an invitee would ordinarily seem greater than the foreseeability of harm
to a trespasser, in a particular case the opposite may be true." Rowland v. Christian, supra at
117-18, 442 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103. Courts will now consider such factors as "the

location of the property in relation to populated areas, its accessibility and whether there have
been any prior incidents of trespassing in the area where the injury occurred," in determining the
likelihood of entry. Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 442, 354 N.E.2d 794, 798, 387
N.Y.S.2d 55, 59 (1976).
43. 40 N.Y.2d at 440-41, 354 N.E.2d at 797-98, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 58-59.
44. Id. at 441, 354 N.E.2d at 798, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
45. Id. at 442, 354 N.E.2d at 798, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 59. The fact that under the common law

rules many cases were summarily dismissed solely on the basis of the plaintiff's status has been
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Scurti the court stressed that the respective roles of the court and jury are to
remain the same as those in the typical negligence action. It is still the
responsibility of the trial court to make the threshold determination as to
whether the4 plaintiff has introduced sufficient facts to support an inference of
negligence . 6
Despite these admonitions, most cases brought under the new rule will
nonetheless be permitted to reach the jury. This is the logical result of a
negligence rule based on the standard of reasonable care, for "itihe very
question of whether the defendant's conduct amounts to 'negligence' is inherently a question for the fact-trier in all but the most egregious instances, 4 7
The overwhelming response to the abrogation of the landowner's immunity
49
48
Nevertheless, the single standard has had its critics.
has been favorable.
Included among the most vociferous is Chief Judge Breitel of the New York
Court of Appeals, who wrote separate opinions in both Basso and Scurti.sO
The Breitel opinions are significant as they are the most recent and thorough
statements advanced in favor of the classification system. Accordingly, they
will be examined in some detail.
Judge Breitel objected to what he termed a "[w]holesale abandonment of
cited in other jurisdictions as a compelling reason for abandoning those rules. See, e.g., Smith v.
Arbaugh's Rest., Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973);
Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 707, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (1973); Mariorenzi v. Joseph
, , 333 A.2d 127, 130 (1975). As noted by one commentator, the
R.I. DiPonte, Inc., rigidity of the classification system "unnecessarily restrict[ed] the province of the jury and
(resulted] in an unjust denial of meritorious claims." 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 426, 430 (1969). The
essential task of determining if the defendant had acted reasonably in light of prevailing
community standards often never reached the jury as courts resolved the issue of liability as a
matter of law solely on the basis of plaintiff's status. Smith v. Arbaugh's Rest., Inc., supra at
103-04; 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 426, 430 (1969).
46. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241-42, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872-73, 386 N.Y.S.2d 565, 568
(1976); Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 442, 354 N.E.2d 794, 798-99, 387 N.Y.S.2d
55, 59 (1976).
47. D. Siegel, Practice Commentary to N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 3212, C3212:8, at 430 (McKinney
1970). See also Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 N.Y.2d 361, 366-67, 320 N.E.2d 853, 856, 362 N.Y.S.2d
131, 135 (1974) (Breitel, C.J., dissenting), citing Sadowski v. Long Island R.R., 292 N.Y. 448,
455, 55 N.E.2d 497, 500 (1944).
48. See, e.g., 33 Albany L. Rev. 230 (1968); 37 Fordham L. Rev. 675 (1969); 44 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 426 (1969); 20 Syracuse L. Rev. 147 (1968).
49. For example, the single standard was considered and specifically rejected in several
states. Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla. 1973); Astleford v. Milner Enterprises, Inc., 233
So. 2d 524, 525 (Miss. 1970); Werth v. Ashley Realty Co., 199 N.W.2d 899, 907 (N.D. 1972). See
also the dissent in Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 120-21, 443 P.2d 561, 569, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 105 (1968).
50. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 243-49, 352 N.E.2d 868, 873-78, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564,
569-73 (1976) (concurring opinion); Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 443-46, 354
N.E.2d 794, 799-801, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55, 59-61 (1976) (concurring and dissenting opinion). See also
his separate opinion in Barker v. Parnossa, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 926, 927-32, 352 N.E.2d 880,
880-84, 386 N.Y.S.2d 576, 576-80 (1976) (concurring opinion).
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the common-law rules governing the liability of a possessor of property."'
Essentially this objection was based on three factors: first, the common law
rules had produced a predictive stability and progressive evolution; S2 second,
the single standard is deceptively simple, overbroad, and "raises more problems than it solves";5 3 and third, it "delegate[s]
to the jury the responsibility to
54
determine the applicable social policy.1
Given the complexity of the common law rules, the difficulty of their
application to varying factual circumstances, and the innumerable judicially
created exceptions and subclassifications, the predictive value of those rules is
questionable. It is difficult to see how predictive stability could be achieved
when courts consistently respond to changing social mores merely by broadening or eliminating the common law categories. Moreover, the evolutionary
progress of the common law rules, reflected by these decisions, was clearly
moving toward the very rule adopted by the majority of the court, i.e., the
imposition of a reasonable standard of care upon landowners."
The single standard of reasonable care is concededly a less complex
formulation of the law than that which previously existed. It is, as noted by
Judge Breitel, "appealingly simple. 's 6 However, it nonetheless allows for
consideration of all the relevant circumstances of any particular case. This
was not true under the prior rules, for while the rules were exceedingly
complex, they could not be adopted to the diversity of factual situations
presented.5 7 The single standard was adopted for precisely this reason.
Judge Breitel's most serious criticism concerns the delegation to the jury of
the determination of the applicable social policy. Interestingly, this precise
concern prompted several courts to abandon the common law rules. For
example, in Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich,58 the Supreme Court of
Colorado felt that under the common law rules the jury had been prevented
"from applying changing community standards to a landowner's duties, [and
that consequently] a harshness
which is inappropriate to a modem legal
59
system has been preserved.1
51. Barker v. Parnossa, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 926, 927, 352 N.E.2d 880, 386 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1976)
(concurring opinion).
52. Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 443, 354 NE.2d 794, 799, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55,
60 (1976) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
53. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 243, 352 N.E.2d 868, 874, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564,569 (1976)
(concurring opinion).
54. Id.
55. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625. 630-31 (1959).
56. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 247; 352 N.E.2d 868, 876; 386 N.YS.2d 56, 572 t1976)
(concurring opinion).
57. With regard to trespasser cases for example, courts and juries were prohibited from
considering the exact nature of the plaintiff's entry once it was decided that he was a trespasser.
Consequently mere inadvertent trespassers were lumped together with criminal trespassers. 46
N.Y. Jur., Premises Liability § 36, at 100 (1966).
58. 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971) (en bane).
59. Id. at 542, 489 P.2d at 312.
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Judge Breitel's reluctance with regard to the jury's function under the new
rules apparently stems from his fear that newly unleashed and sympathetic
juries will flood the courts with an unwarranted number of plaintiffs' verdicts. 60 Other courts have expressed similar fears when they suggest that one
result of the abolition of the common law classifications will be to "make the
owner an insurer of those who come upon his premises." 6' These concerns
seem unfounded 62 since they fail to recognize that "[e]liminating reliance on
the common law classifications does not leave the jury awash, without
standards to guide its determination of reasonable conduct. '63 As in any
negligence action, the jury must be counseled by the court as to the essential
elements of such an action, as well as to any defenses available to the
defendant. With proper and careful instructions from the court, problems
64
such as an unwarranted burden on landowners need never arise.
Judge Breitel specifically recognized that much of the criticism regarding
60. "The 'single standard' provides hospitable ground for the play of jury ad hoc promulgation of 'rules' of law, social policy, and sometimes humane but ungoverned and ungovernable
sympathy." Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 248; 352 N.E.2d 868, 877, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 572
(1976) (concurring opinion) (italics deleted).
61. Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 696 (Fla. 1973). Four courts adopting the single standard
specifically emphasized that landowners would not be insurers of their land and would not be
unreasonably burdened. Smith v. Arbaugh's Rest., Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973);
Mariorenzi v. DiPonte, Inc., R.I. , , 333 A.2d 127, 132 (1975); Antoniewicz v.
Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 849, 236 N.W.2d 1, 7 (1975). California cases applying the single
standard are in accord. See, e.g., Rogers v. Jones, 56 Cal. App. 3d 346, 351, 128 Cal. Rptr. 404,
407 (4th Dist. 1976). It must be stressed that the standard is reasonableness, not perfection. The
law does not exact an unreasonable amount of care from anyone. Alesi v. City of New York, 9
App. Div. 2d 236, 243, 192 N.Y.S.2d 929, 935 (1st Dep't 1959), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 703, 185
N.E.2d 916, 233 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1962); Celebrity Studios, Inc. v. Civetta Excavating Inc., 72
Misc. 2d 1077, 1082, 340 N.Y.S.2d 694, 700 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
62. See 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 426, 431-32 (1969). Even assuming that an increase in plaintiffs'
verdicts will result, "there is something distasteful in the view that tribunals cannot be afforded
the best equipment for reaching sensible decisions because that equipment is likely to be abused
. . . One cannot afford to sympathize for long with the view that a legal system must carry the
burden of fictitious and obscurantist doctrine in order to keep vital issues away from that tribunal
which was constituted to decide them." Hughes, supra note 7, at 700.
63. Smith v. Arbaugh's Rest., Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
939 (1973).
64. "The jury should [be) given some guidance with respect to the application of the law of
negligence to the facts of the case." Walsh v. Wilkie, 20 App. Div. 2d 634, 246 N.Y.S.2d 279,
280 (1st Dep't 1964) (mem.). See Smith v. Arbaugh's Rest., Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 106 n.48 (D.C. Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973), for an example of a well structured jury instruction
under the new rule. The jury should be instructed that in determining the degree of care required
of a landowner they should balance the " 'likelihood that [the landowner's] conduct will injure
others, taken with the seriousness of the injury . . . against the interest which [the landownerl
must sacrifice to avoid the risk.' " Id. at 105-06, quoting Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612
(2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 492 (1940).
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the common law rules was warranted 65 and indicated two distinct areas
where those rules should be re-evaluated. The first involved the distinctions
between licensees and invitees. He stated that "in the proper cases, many if
not all, of the distinctions between licensees and invitees could be modified or
should be eliminated. '66 In addition, he has urged that New York adopt the
"attractive nuisance" doctrine with regard to children trespassers. 67 The result
of this child trespasser rule would be the imposition on the landowner of "a
limited obligation to the child, falling short of a duty to prevent all foreseeable
harm to him, but requiring reasonable care as to those conditions against
which he may be expected to be unable to protect himself." 68 To a large
69
extent, this rule is in accord with the new rules announced in Basso.
Viewing Judge Breitel's opinions in the aggregate reveals that his most
strenuous objection to the single standard pertains to cases dealing with
trespassers, particularly adult trespassers. 70 In this regard he is joined by the
highest courts of several jurisdictions. 7 In Mounsey v. Ellard,72 the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts adopted a common duty of reasonable care for all
lawful visitors. In a footnote the court specifically rejected extending the rule
to trespassers, stating that "there is [a] significant difference in the legal status
of one who trespasses on another's land as opposed to one who is on the land
under some color of right .... "73 The court felt that the possible differences
in the various types of trespassers were miniscule in comparison to the
differences between the classes of licensees. 74 Similarily, the Supreme Court
65. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 247, 352 N.E.2d 868, 876, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 572 (1976)
(concurring opinion).
66. Id. at 248, 352 N.E.2d at 877, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 573 (concurring opinion).
67. Barker v. Parnossa, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 926, 927, 352 N.E.2d 880, 386 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1976)
(concurring opinion).
68. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339, comment b at 198 (1965); see note 11 supra.
69. There are, however, some clear differences. For example, in Beard v. Atchison, Topeka
and Santa Fe Ry., 4 Cal. App. 3d 130, 84 Cal. Rptr. 449 (2d Dist. 1970), the court stated that
"[ulnder [the single standard] the liability of a possessor of property to trespassing children is no
longer limited by the conditions set out in Restatement, Second, Torts, § 339 ...." Id. at 135-36,
84 Cal. Rptr. at 454. For the possible changes that the single standard might bring to the rules
pertaining to trespassing children, see J. Page, The Law of Premises Liability § 6 6(c). at 133-34
(1976).
70. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 248, 352 N.E.2d 868, 877, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 573 (1976)
(concurring opinion). It is at this point that Judge Breitel questions the application of the new rule
to criminal trespassers. In this regard, "[i]f it is felt that the general negligence approach does not
provide a firm rationale for taking proper account of the plaintiff's criminal conduct, the general
principle of ex turpi causa non oritur actio is always available." Hughes, supra note 7, at 701
n.294 (italics deleted).
71. See cases cited in note 6 supra. The distinctions between licensees and invitees were
abolished in Great Britain by the Occupier's Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz 2, c. 31, § 2 (1957)
72. 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973).
73. Id. at 707 n.7, 297 N.E.2d at 51 n.7.
74. Id.
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of Minnesota, in Peterson v. Balach,7- refrained from extending the rule to
trespassers. The court stated that "the considerations governing a landowner's
or occupant's liability to trespassers may be fundamentally different from his
duty to those whom he has expressly or by implication invited onto his
property. .

.

. Sweeping away all distinction between trespassers and social

guests and business invitees is a drastic step to take because there may be,
and often
is, good reason to distinguish between a trespasser and a social
'7 6
guest.
Retention of the common law rules as to trespassers is inconsistent with the
underlying logical basis utilized by these courts to abolish the distinctions
between licensees and invitees. Such a decision "tends to perpetuate . . .the

kind of tradition-bound and mistaken analysis that.. . the court was aiming
to correct."177 To resolve the question of liability as to the many types of
trespassers by simply classifying them under one doctrinal rubric prevents an
analysis of the precise circumstances of their entry onto the defendant's
property. Surely there is an obvious difference between the burglar and the
person who mistakenly wanders onto another's property. Yet under the
common law approach both would receive the same treatment. Furthermore,
it is often just as difficult to distinguish the trespasser from the licensee or
invitee as it is to distinguish the licensee from the invitee.
Most importantly however, the "very effort at dry classification and differentiation puts the emphasis at the wrong places." 7 8 The abolition of the
categorical system properly shifts the primary concern of the court from the
status of the plaintiff to the conduct of the defendant. Retention of the
trespasser rule will often prevent any examination of the culpable activities of
the defendant as the case will be resolved
on the preliminary determination of
79
the plaintiffs status as a trespasser.
It is clear, however, that the adoption of the rule of reasonable care as to all
classes of entrants will enlarge the landowner's potential liability. This is
particularly true with regard to trespasser cases. As the extent of the increased
liability is unclear at this point, several decisions in other jurisdictions
recognizing the single standard will be analyzed.
In Johnson v. Krueger,80 the plaintiff, a fourteen year old minor, was
injured when, during the course of a touch football game, he ran onto
defendant's adjacent lot and fell onto the stump of a fallen tree. The action
was dismissed at the close of the plaintiff's evidence. The Colorado Court of
Appeals, in affirming the dismissal, construed Mile High Fence Co. v.
Radovich8 ' as holding that status, while no longer the controlling determinant
75.
76.

294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972).
Id. at 164-65, 199 N.W.2d at 642.

77. Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 717, 297 N.E.2d 43, 57 (1973) (Kaplan, J.,
concurring).
78. Id.
79. See note 42 supra.
80. 539 P.2d 1296 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
81. 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971) (en banc).
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of the standard of care to be applied, should nevertheless be considered in
deciding whether a property owner acted reasonably in view of the probability or forseeability of injury to others. The court stated that Mile High Fence
"does not8 2preclude the classification of persons who enter on another's
property.1

In Mark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 8 3 a college student was electrocuted
while trying to unscrew a light bulb from a street lamp located outside his
apartment window. The trial court granted defendant's motion for a nonsuit.
The Supreme Court of California reversed, stating that jury questions were
presented with regard to whether Pacific Gas knew or should have known
that plaintiff or his roommates had been unscrewing the bulb of the lamppost;
harm;
whether the high voltage current constituted an unreasonable risk of
84
and whether reasonable safety precautions could have been taken.
Under the traditional trespasser rules the plaintiff would not have had a
case. As the negligence of Pacific Gas was merely passive, it had not violated
any duty to the plaintiff. "The active/passive negligence concept, however, no
longer represents an inflexible limitation upon the imposition of liability to
trespassers or licensees.""5
It has been suggested that "Mark places upon possessors a duty of reasonable care, under the circumstances, to discover trespassers. '8 6 It seems more
reasonable to assume, however, that the court meant that defendant had facts
within its knowledge from which it should have concluded that persons had
been tampering with the street lamp. 8

7

Nonetheless, the imposition of a duty

to discover trespassers does not seem entirely unreasonable in certain circumstances, such as a situation where defendant is conducting an extremely
dangerous activity upon his property. In such a situation the duty to be on
guard for the safety of trespassers is not too unreasonable a burden to be
placed upon the landowner.
One problem does arise with regard to the imposition of a standard of
ordinary care upon landowners under all the circumstances. The problem
centers on the question of whether the financial capacity of the landowner
should be taken into account in determining whether he has acted in a
reasonable manner. In Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., a8 the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals considered this problem and suggested that "what
might be a 'reasonable' maintenance burden for one homeowner may require
unreasonable sacrifices for another." 89 The court made this statement while
82. 539 P.2d at 1298.
83. 7 Cal. 3d 170, 496 P.2d 1276, 101 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1972).
84. Id. at 178, 496 P.2d at 1281, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
85. Id. at 176, 496 P.2d at 1279, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 911. See also Scurti v. City of New York,
40 N.Y.2d 433, 440-41, 354 N.E.2d 794, 797-98, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55, 58 (1976)
86. J. Page, The Law of Premises Liability § 6.6(c), at 133 (1976).
87. For a discussion of the meaning of "should know" in this context see Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 334, comment c, at 186 (1965).
88. 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cerL denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
89. Id. at 107. Significantly, this statement was quoted by the court in Mounsey v Ellard,
363 Mass. 693, 709 n.10, 297 N.E.2d 43, 53 n.10 (1973).
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attempting to respond to a charge that the single standard would impose an
unreasonable burden upon residential homeowners. In a subsequent opinion,
the court elaborated further by stating that "the financial capacity of the
occupant to undertake safety precautions should be taken into account in
determining what was, for him, reasonable maintainance conduct." 90
This view has been justifiably criticized as an unwarranted departure from
the traditional objective standard test for determining what is reasonable
conduct. 91 Moreover, evidence of the defendant's wealth could improperly
sway the jury's assessment of damages. Clearly, it does not seem that a
departure from the rule that "evidence of a defendant's wealth does not bear
upon a judgment as to the reasonableness of his conduct"9 2 is warranted or
desirable.
As previously indicated, 93 one of the theories advanced to support the
common law trespasser rule was based on the assumption that one who enters
another's land without permission has assumed the risk of any dangers upon
the land or is contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In Scurti the court
pointed out that it was an untenable legal fiction to automatically apply such
an assumption to all trespasser cases. 9 Nonetheless, the court implied that in
certain factual circumstances, a finding that a trespasser has assumed the risk
or is contributorily negligent as a result of his unpermitted entry may be
warranted. 95 With the abolition of the categorical system, questions pertaining to the plaintiffs fault in relation to the manner of his entry upon the
defendant's property will properly become separate issues of significant importance. Consequently, the traditional rules of contributory negligence, and
more recently comparative negligence, will assume a more prominent role in
premises liability cases. 96 This will be especially critical in cases involving
trespassers.
9
New York plaintiffs whose actions accrued prior to September 1, 1975 7
90.
91.

Cooper v. Goodwin, 478 F.2d 653, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
J. Page, The Law of Premises Liability § 6.6, at 127 (1976).

See also the concurring

opinion of Judge Leventhal in Cooper v. Goodwin, 478 F.2d 653, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (the
majority's view is "an extraordinary statement for a judicial opinion, and in my view it is, as
stated, an unsound proposition").
92. J. Page, The Law of Premises Liability § 6.6, at 128 (1976).
93. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
94. 40 N.Y.2d 433, 440, 354 N.E.2d 794, 797, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55, 58 (1976).
95. Id.
96. Under the category system the question of whether the plaintiff had been contributorily
negligent in entering the land was subsumed in the determination of his status. However, since
"the trespassing status of the plaintiff [inevitably raises) the issue of contributory negligence,"
Hughes, supra note 7, at 688, it is clear that these questions will now be properly evaluated.
97.
Causes of action accruing on or after September 1, 1975 will be governed by N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney Supp. 1975), which was given a strictly prospective application.
N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1413 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
The ruling in Basso will be given retrospective application to all cases which are still in the
judicial process and which have not reached final judicial repose. See, e.g., Supples v. Canadian
Nat'l Ry., App. Div. 2d -,
386 N.Y.S.2d 489 (4th Dep't 1976); Garlock v. Penn Cent.
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will generally have the burden of proving their freedom from contributory
negligence by a fair preponderance of the evidence. In the event that the
plaintiff is found to be contributorily negligent he will be completely barred
from recovery. 98
The facts involved in Scurti are illustrative of the role of contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk in such cases. The plaintiff in Scurti
was almost fifteen years of age at the time of his death and had completed his
first year of high school. The testimony of one of his peers indicated that
plaintiff was aware of the dangers involved in playing on the railroad cars. 99
Putting aside for the moment the question of plaintiff's age and capacity to
understand the risk involved, and assuming the truthfulness of his contemporaries' testimony, it would seem that plaintiff had voluntarily and heedlessly exposed himself to a known danger.' 00 He would consequently be
barred from any recovery whatsoever for "[o]ne will not be heard to complain
of results one has invited."' 0 1 The effect of plaintiff's age on his ability to
appreciate the dangers involved would render the issue of his assumption of
the risk a factual question to be determined by the jury. It is clear that in a
case such as Scurti, where the cause of action accrued before September 1,
1975, the determination of this issue will be crucial to plaintiff's success.
As to those cases accruing after September 1, 1975, the fault attributable to
the plaintiff will be assessed in accordance with section 1411 of the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules.102 Under this enactment, a plaintiff who
establishes that defendant's negligence caused his injuries, but who has been
contributorily negligent, will be allowed to recover. However, the size of his

App. Div. 2d , 386 N.Y.S.2d 491 (4th Dep't 1976). Thus, it is apparent
Transp. Co., that for some time there will be premises liability cases which will be governed by the traditional
contributory negligence rules.
98. For a general discussion of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk in New
York, see 41 N.Y. Jur., Negligence §§ 49-75 (1965).
99. 40 N.Y.2d 433, 444, 354 N.E.2d 794, 800, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55, 61 (1976) (Breitel, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting). Specifically, the testimony indicated plaintiff's awareness of the
dangers presented by the high-tension wires which caused his death.
100. In Scurti, the causal connection between plaintiff's unlawful entry and his resulting
injuries seems clear. Nonetheless it would remain a jury question. A more perplexing question
arises in those cases where an adult trespasser enters another's land unaware of the risks
involved. Assumption of the risk requires an awareness and understanding of the risk incurred.
Prosser, supra note 7, at 447. Thus, it would seem that this doctrine cannot apply. Usually, a
trespasser will no more expect to be injured than will the invitee or licensee. However, it might
fairly be argued that in entering land where the plaintiff knows he is not expected he has
indicated his consent and willingness to encounter whatever unknown dangers might exist.
Furthermore it might also be argued that "the trespasseres unlawful act is a sine qua non of the
infliction of harm." Hughes, supra note 7, at 687 (italics deleted). Precisely such an analysis
resulted in finding trespassers guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. This approach
has been properly rejected as overbroad. Hughes, supra note 7,at 688.
101. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Childs Co., 253 N.Y. 324, 327, 171 N.E. 391, 192
(1930).
102. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
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award will be proportionately
diminished to the extent that his own conduct
10 3
contributed to his injuries.
This statute speaks in terms of "culpable conduct" rather than in terms of
contributory negligence or assumption of the risk. The term "culpable conduct" was chosen "because this article will apply to cases where the conduct
of one or more of the parties will be found to be not negligent,1' 0 4but will
nonetheless be a factor in determining the amount of damages."
Such an interpretation raises interesting possibilities. While unpermitted
entries which would themselves constitute, contributory negligence or assumption of the risk are covered by the statute, it remains undecided whether mere
trespassing, unrelated to the plaintiff's injuries except to the extent that it
brings the plaintiff to the scene of the accident, is "culpable conduct" within
the meaning of the statute. A hypothetical might serve to crystallize the
problem: plaintiff, an adult, deliberately uses his neighbor's yard as a shortcut and is injured when he falls on some concealed object. Assuming
liability, 105 will the plaintiff's recovery be diminished as a result of his
unlawful entry? The question is not easily answered. As a preliminary matter
it should be noted that "[o]nly culpable conduct which was a substantial
factor in causing the harm for which recovery is sought is to be considered in
determining the amount by which damages are to be diminished."' 0 6 Within
the framework of the hypothetical, the plaintiff's deliberate trespass, which is
itself a tort,10 7 should be considered "culpable conduct." Whether this conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries is a question of
fact which should be submitted to the jury.
The rationale underlying the abolition of the landowner's immunities has
led to some interesting results in other jurisdictions which have adopted the
single standard.108 One area of particular concern is the tort liability of a
103. Id. Moreover, the burden of proof is now placed upon the defendant to plead and prove
that the plaintiff's conduct was partially responsible for his injuries. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1412
(McKinney Supp. 1975).
104. Report of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York to the 1975 Legislature in
Relation to the Civil Practice Law and Rules 19 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Conference Report].
The Conference Report further elaborated, stating that "[nleither the specific examples of
culpable conduct mentioned in the statute nor those used in this comment are necessarily
exhaustive of the range of 'culpable conduct' which may properly be considered. Judicial
development of the concept of 'culpable conduct' consistent with the goals of this article is not
precluded." Id. at 23. Significantly, the Conference Report included "intentional misconduct" in
its examples of culpable conduct. Id.
105. Such an assumption could well be made if, for example, the landowner was aware of the
existence of the concealed object and its dangerous condition, and also aware of the existence of
trespassers.
106. Conference Report, supra note 104, at 25.
107. See generally Prosser, supra note 7, § 13, at 63-76.
108. Thus, for example, the adoption of the rule of ordinary care with regard to landowner's
tort liabilities has provided one jurisdiction with a compelling reason to hold its automobile guest
statute unconstitutional. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
The Court reasoned that "[ijust as it is unreasonable to lower the standard of care owed to a
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lessor for injuries resulting from dangerously defective conditions in leased
premises.
In most jurisdictions the lessor enjoys a common law immunity remarkably
similar to that which the landowner was previously afforded in New York.10 9
The general rule is that a lessor is not liable for conditions upon the demised
premises after the transfer of possession. 1 "' His immunity from tort liability
resulted from the application of the doctrine of caveat enptor to the lessor/
lessee relationship. 111 Under this doctrine the tenant is required to take the
premises as he finds them.
visitor on private property because such visitor is 'only' a social guest rather than a 'paying'
invitee, it is unreasonable to single out automobile guest and to expose them to greater dangers
from negligence than paying passengers." Id. at 870, 506 P.2d at 222, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 398. One
court has stated that the decision in Brown was the logical consequence of the abolition of the
common law classification. Cannon v. Oviatt, -

Utah 2d -.

-

, 520 P.2d 883, 886

(1974). Cf. Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974) (ruling guest statute
unconstitutional, yet retaining invitee-licensee distinction); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518
P.2d 362 (1974) (same); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1974) (same).
New York does not have an automobile guest statute and the owner or operator of an
automobile owes an invited guest a duty of reasonable care in the operation of the vehicle. See
generally 4A N.Y. Jur., Automobiles and Other Vehicles §§ 805-15 (1974).
With regard to the owner's or operator's liability for injuries to trespassers on his vehicle, some
decisions indicate that the owner is liable only where he is guilty of wanton or reckless
misconduct toward the trespasser. See, e.g., Thibodeau v. Gerosa Haulage & Warehouse Corp.,
252 App. Div. 615, 616-17, 300 N.Y.S. 686, 688-89 (2d Dep't 1937), aff'd, 278 N Y 551, 16
N.E.2d 98 (1938). In light of Basso however, this approach seems clearly incorrect and an
operator of a motor vehicle should now be held to a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety
of known trespassers on his vehicle.
Whether Basso will affect the owner's liabilities to his passenger for injuries sustained as a result
of a defective condition of the vehicle is questionable as the present rules essentially provide for a
standard of reasonable conduct. See 4A N.Y. Jur., Automobiles and Other Vehicles §811 t1974).
However, one area where change might be anticipated regards the owner's duty to inspect the
vehicle for defects. Traditionally, the owner was responsible to his passenger merely for injuries
resulting from defective conditions known to the owner. See, e.g., Higgins v Mason, 255 NY.
104, 174 N.E. 77 (1930); Lee v. Bennett, 29 App. Div. 2d 849, 287 N.Y.S.Zd 953 (l6t Dep't
1968). As to unknown defects it was sometimes said that the passenger assumed the risk of any
injuries resulting from such defects. See Prosser, supra note 7, § 60, at 383. This rule was based
on an analogy to the landowner's non-liability to a licensee for mere passive conditions on the
property. Id. It is suggested that under the Basso standard, the failure of an owner of a motor
vehicle to inspect for possible defects might very well constitute a breach of reasonable care.
109. See notes 11-15 supra and accompanying text.
110. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 335-36 (1966); Prosser, supra note 7, § 63, at 400, see
Campbell v. Elsie S. Holding Co., 251 N.Y. 446, 167 N.E. 582 (1929).
111. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 394, 308 A.2d 528, 532 (1973); Note. Lessor's Duty to
Repair:. Tort Liability to Persons Injured on the Premises, 62 Harv, L. Rev. 669 1949); 59
Cornell L. Rev. 1161 (1974). "When land is leased to a tenant, the law of property regards the
lease as equivalent to a sale of the premises for the term." Prosser, supra note 7. at 399.
For a general discussion of the historical development of the law of landlord-tenant relationships, see Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with
Guidelines for the Future, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 225 (1969).
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Modern ideas of social policy, as well as changes in the economic and social
conditions, have induced courts to create a number of exceptions to the
general rule of nonliability. 112 Generally, a lessor will be liable if the injury is
attributable to: 1) a dangerous condition concealed from the tenant at the time
the lease was executed;1 13 2) a defect in premises under the lessor's control or
provided for the common use of the tenants;11 4 3) a defect in premises leased
for the admission of the public;115 4) negligent repairs by the landlord;"1 6 or 5)
1 7
defects existing in violation of a statutory or contractual duty to repair.
Unless a case falls within the purview of one of these exceptions, the landlord
will have "no responsibility to compensate the lessee [or his visitors] for losses
caused . . . by the condition of the leased premises.""18

The anomaly of the landlord rule and the rigidity of its standard exceptions
were factors which compelled the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in
Sargent v. Ross, 119 to abandon the rules altogether and to hold that "[h]enceforth, landlords as other persons must exercise
reasonable care not to subject
20
others to an unreasonable risk of harm."'
In Sargent, a four year old child died as a result of a fall from an outside
staircase leading to the tenant's apartment on the second floor. There was
evidence that the stairs were dangerously steep and that the railing was
insufficient to prevent the child from falling over the side.121
The court cited a, number of reasons for departing from the traditional
112. Landlord/tenant law, derived from feudal concepts of property law, bears little relationship to the complexities of city life. "In order to understand landlord-tenant law one must forget
the modern urban complex with its towering office buildings, its sprawl of huge apartments, and
its teeming slums. The place to start is with the countryside ....
Quinn & Phillips, The Law of
Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past With Guidelines for the Future, 38 Fordham
L. Rev. 225, 226-27 (1969).
The policy considerations reflect more than the change from a rural to an urban society. They
also indicate a concern reflecting the merits of imposing upon the landlord certain obligations
with respect to the safety of others. Such considerations include the recognition that the landlord
is often in a better financial situation than the tenant and thus better able to effect repairs upon
the premises. Furthermore, as most modern tenancies are for a relatively short period, tenants
have little to gain by engaging in substantial alterations. See Putnam v. Stout, 38 N.Y.2d 607,
617-18, 345 N.E.2d 319, 326, 381 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854 (1976).
113. "There is 'something like fraud' in a failure to give warning of a known hidden danger
." Prosser, supra note 7, at 401. However, the lessor must know or have reason to know of
the existence of the dangerous condition. Id.; see Harper & James, supra note 3, at 1506.
114. Harper & James, supra note 3, at 1516-18; Prosser, supra note 7, at 405-08; Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 360-61 (1965).
115. Harper & James, supra note 3, at 1510-13; Prosser, supra note 7, at 403-05; Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 359 (1965).
116. Harper & James, supra note 3, at 1514-15; Prosser, supra note 7, at 410-12.
117. Putnam v. Stout, 38 N.Y.2d 607, 345 N.E.2d 319, 381 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1976) (imposing
tort liability on the basis of a failure to fulfill a covenant to repair).
118. 2 R. Powell, Real Property
234[2][f] (rev. ed. P. Rohan ed. 1975).
119.
113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
120. Id. at 397, 308 A.2d at 534.
121. Id. at 390, 308 A.2d at 530.
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common law. First, it found that under the orthodox analysis neither the
landlord (arguing lack of control) nor the tenant (arguing lack of authority to
alter the defect) would be responsible for the dangerous condition. 122 The
court held that such a result would be "both illogical and intolerable,
particularly since neither party then would have any legal reason to remedy or
take precautionary measures with respect to dangerous conditions."12 3 The
court found that the burden for such repairs should be assumed by the
landlord since he "is best able to remedy dangerous
conditions, particularly
24
where a substantial alteration is required."'
Furthermore, the court felt that the social policies which had formed the
basis for the landlord's immunity were no longer viable. The doctrine of
caveat emptor in the landlord/tenant context had been undermined by the
court's recognition of the landlord's implied warranty of habitability,' 2s and
26
as a result there was no longer any justification for the lessor's immunity.'
Finally, the court noted that the imposition of a standard of reasonable care
for the lessor was compatible with the judicial trend toward the abrogation of
immunities
from tort liability for certain classes of people, including land27
owners. 1

Similarly, a California court has ruled that "a landlord must act toward his
tenant as a reasonable person under all of the circumstances, including the
likelihood of injury, the probable seriousness of such injury, the burden of
reducing or avoiding the risk, and his degree of control over the risk-creating
defect .... ,,"28 It is significant that this decision was considered to be an
extension of the rationale of Rowland v. Christian,2 9 the landmark case
abolishing the
common law distinctions between licensees, invitees, and
0
trespassers.' 3

122. Id. at 394, 308 A.2d at 532.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. New Hampshire imposed the warranty of habitability in Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87,
276 A.2d 248 (1971). In New York the implied warranty of habitability is imposed by statute.
N.Y.R.P.L. § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1975).
126. " 'Judicial discarding of the sale concept [and hence, of caveat emptor) would leave the
courts with an easy recourse to established principles of law; the lessor would fall within the
general proposition underlying many areas of tort law that he who owns or is in a position to
control or is responsible for things or persons has the duty to prevent their harming others ......
Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 397, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973), quoting Note, Lessor's Duty to
Repair: Tort Liability to Persons Injured on the Premises, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 669, 678( 1949) (italics
deleted).
127. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 396, 309 A.2d 528, 533 (1973).
128. Brennan v. Cockrell Inv., Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 800-01, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122. 125
(4th Dist. 1973); Golden v. Conway, 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 955. 128 Cal. Rptr. 69. 73 (ist Dist.
1976). See also Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App 1976).
129. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) ten band.
130. It should be noted that these decisions were partially grounded in Califorma's negligence
statute. Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (West 1973). This statute provides in part that l[elvery one is
responsible . . . for an injury occasioned . . . by his want of ordinary care or skill in the
management of his property or person .... . It has been suggested that section 1714 is merely a
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The incongruity of the rule of lessor non-liability becomes clear in light of
Basso. The landlord immunity, like the landowner immunity, fails to reflect
contemporary community values and ethics. Courts have recognized the
harshness which results from this common law rule and have sought to create
further exceptions to it. In effect, these exceptions do little more than
perpetuate further judicial fictions without adequately recognizing the complexities of modern life. Furthermore, they tend to create judicial confusion
and waste as they have "unduly complicated the jury's task and [have]
diverted effort and attention from the central issue of the unreasonableness of
the risk.''13 1 Adoption of the single standard for lessors will allow the court
and jury to consider the relevancy of questions such as control, public or
common use, and hidden defects within the context of the facts before them.
Such questions would be "relevant only inasmuch as they bear on the basic
tort issues such as the foreseeability and unreasonableness of the particular
risk of harm.'

32

Basso represents "a triumph of realism over formalism."'1 33 It is a decision
based upon common sense and common experience. It is representative of a
trend in tort law toward "the elimination of technical status positions which
had the effect of insulating certain classes from liability . . . .M'34 Its logical
basis should be adopted with regard to other classifications 35 which still
codification of the modern tort concept of duty rather than a significant extension of it. 44
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 426, 432-33 n.48 (1969).
131. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 396, 308 A.2d 528, 533 (1973).
132. Id. at 398, 308 A.2d at 534.
133. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 39, Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 354
N.E.2d 794, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1976).
134. Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 508, 513 (1970).
135. For example, policemen and firemen have been afforded separate treatment under the
traditional common law rules. In New York they have been placed in a separate category,
distinct from the categories of licensees and invitees. Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, Inc.,
4 App. Div. 2d 276, 280, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276, 280 (1st Dep't 1957). Essentially, the courts have
treated the duties of the landowner as being twofold. First, the owner is obligated to keep those
areas which are ordinarily utilized as a means of access in reasonably safe condition. Meiers v.
Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920); McCarthy v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 30
App. Div. 2d 111, 113, 290 N.Y.S.2d 255, 257 (1st Dep't 1968). Second, if the owner is aware of
the presence of such public servants and is aware of a dangerous condition on his land, and has
reason to believe that they are unaware of the danger, he is obligated to warn them of the
condition and the risk involved. Schwab v. Rubel Corp., 286 N.Y. 525, 37 N.E.2d 234 (1941);
McCarthy v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 30 App. Div. 2d 111, 113, 290 N.Y.S.2d 255, 257 (1st Dep't
1968). The landowner owed no duty to safeguard those areas outside the ordinary passageways or
to discover potential dangers within them because "entry thereon by such persons under unusual
conditions at any hour of the day or night is not reasonably foreseeable." Beedenbender v.
Midtown Properties, Inc., 4 App. Div. 2d 276, 282, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276, 281 (1st Dep't 1957).
The continuing viability of these rules in light of Basso is doubtful. As can readily be
perceived, the foreseeability of the public employee's presence in certain areas of the premises was
determined as a matter of law. This is once again one of those "immutable" propositions of the
common law which Basso overturned. Undoubtedly, the considerations which led the common
law courts to this result will continue to be relevant to the determination of the owner's duty.
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prevail in other aspects of tort law, particularly landlord/tenant law. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, the decision clearly represents a1 recognition
36
that the "preeminance of land over life is no longer accepted.
William J. Comiskev
136. Smith v. Arbaugh's Rest., Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 939 (1973). In an oft-quoted passage, noticeably absent in the New York decisions, this
consideration was eloquently expressed: "A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of
protection by the law nor a loss less worthy of compensation under the law because he has come
upon the land of another without permission or with permission but without a business purpose
Reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their conduct depending upon such matters, and to
focus upon the status of the injured party as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee in order to determine
the question whether the landowner has a duty of care, is contrary to our modern social mores
and humanitarian values." Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 118, 443 P.2d 561, S68 70 Cal
Rptr. 97, 104 (1968) (en banc).

